GrapheneOS and Forensic Extraction of Data Overview GrapheneOS is an Android-based, open-source mobile operating system focused on privacy and security. It is considered highly secure, sometimes outperforming iOS in specific scenarios. In early May 2024, misinformation spread on social media falsely claiming GrapheneOS had been compromised due to its allowance of consent-based data extraction. This article clarifies what forensic data extraction means and how GrapheneOS defends against such attacks. --- Digital Forensics Basics Digital forensics involves analyzing electronic data from devices like smartphones for legal evidence. Digital evidence is data that can be used in investigations or trials. While critical for justice, digital forensics can also be abused to violate privacy or intimidate individuals. GrapheneOS aims to minimize unauthorized data extraction. --- Cellebrite and Forensic Data Extraction Cellebrite is a leading digital forensics company, selling tools (e.g., UFED) worldwide, including to authoritarian governments. Their tools extract data from mobile devices by: Consent-based extraction: User voluntarily unlocks device (provides PIN/password), allowing data extraction. Hacking/unlocking: Using exploits to bypass locked screens. Brute forcing: Guessing PIN/password by trying many combinations. --- Device States Relevant to Forensics BFU (Before First Unlock): Device has been rebooted but not unlocked after reboot; data remains encrypted. AFU (After First Unlock): Device has been unlocked after reboot, encryption keys are in memory; data accessible but screen lock may still protect access. BFU devices are much harder to extract data from compared to AFU devices. --- Cellebrite Capabilities (April 2024) Cellebrite claims to exploit every non-GrapheneOS Android device (both BFU and AFU states). They also have capabilities on many iOS devices except the latest models. However, they admit they cannot hack GrapheneOS devices that have been updated since late 2022. GrapheneOS ships frequent automatic security updates, likely protecting most users. --- Consent-Based Extraction and GrapheneOS Cellebrite's tools can perform full filesystem extraction if the user voluntarily unlocks the device. For GrapheneOS, this involves enabling developer options and using standard Android Debug Bridge (ADB) tools. They cannot brute force a random 6-digit PIN on Pixel 6+ devices running GrapheneOS. This means data remains safe unless the user willingly unlocks the phone. --- Social Media Misinformation Attack Attackers conflated consent-based extraction with a security compromise. Similar misinformation occurred in 2020 with Cellebrite and Signal app claims. Signal’s database is encrypted locally, and extraction requires the device to be unlocked and the app opened. --- GrapheneOS Defense Measures Protection Against Hacking via USB Blocks new USB connections in AFU mode after device lock. Fully disables USB data at hardware level when no active connection. Users can restrict USB data even in BFU or fully unlocked modes. Enhances defense from unauthorized access over USB. Protection Against Brute Force Attacks Pixel 6+ devices feature Titan M2 security chip managing decryption keys. Limits PIN guess attempts: after 5 failures, delays increase exponentially. After 140 failed attempts, limits to 1 attempt per day. Hardware security chip (Titan M2) is highly resistant to bypass. GrapheneOS offers stronger brute force protections than iOS. Auto Reboot Feature Phone automatically reboots after a user-set interval (default 18 hours). Reboot transitions the device from AFU to BFU state, re-encrypting data at rest. Makes exploiting vulnerabilities a timed challenge for attackers. After reboot, data extraction becomes exceedingly difficult. --- ##